light gazing, ışığa bakmak

Showing posts with label kiddos. Show all posts
Showing posts with label kiddos. Show all posts

Monday, July 24, 2017

Sunday, July 16, 2017

Saturday, April 15, 2017

beira rio




Monday, March 27, 2017

silvery days



Monday, February 27, 2017

LOVit e não só






on a day out with my beautiful kiddo.

Thursday, January 19, 2017

kiddo at seven in the morning

proud momma

Saturday, December 31, 2016

Tuesday, December 27, 2016

O Padeiro, perto da 5 de Outubro




minha querida I., que grande orgulho

cake competition



Friday, December 23, 2016

onde estamos

aqui, o B. vê onde quer usar os fnac cards, o ram, o VR, o não-sei-quê. eu vejo um design espectacular, as frases do marketing dez estrelas e a imagem então, um Nobel para a imagem deste 'baby'.

exemplos que me levam às lágrimas:
Don't just participate. Dominate.
Intimidating performance.
a malta que faz isto é cara. pelo menos espero que seja, porque o merecem.
o logo é bonito, pena o cubo ser tão grande.



Sunday, December 18, 2016

queria dar isto a uma miúda

mas dizem-me que está esgotado.
aqui em pdf, Escuta Zé Ninguém.

Saturday, December 17, 2016

just nice


Rogue One

so it is another war film but hey it's Starwars. satisfying and funny at times, another fighting girl (one) in a cast of mostly male actors. one Muslim, one Asian (my favorite!) in a somewhat more inclusive cast if one doesn't count women. funny funny thing, if unsettling, is the political transformation: the empire is now any empire, not just a dictatorship that is less human, but an empire of human white males; while the Rebellion is now as burocratic unable to decide organization (two women more, yay) that seems incredibly like the EU in its political process. the major shift is the appearance of a third group, the extremist rebels of Saw Gerrera that seem to hold the heroe status in spite of behaving in every way similar to any terrorist group acting today. most surprising. the heroes themselves are loner misfits, not the shiny hope of the Force anymore, but outsiders - which is compatible with the American myth of the lonesome cowboy/hero.
the sets are all too earthy for my taste, anyway, nothing seems to take place in a galaxy far far away anymore.
best thing, amazing, of the film: its soundtrack. wow!

about Rogue One politics, here.

If 'Rogue One' is so progressive, where the heck are all the women?


pancake morning


Tuesday, December 13, 2016

before and after and much after


baguette pizza, a vegetariana era minha. mais rápido de fazer não existe, basta combinar, ir ao forno, combinar um pouco mais e está feito. carne com cominhos e quase tinha 'pide'.

depois de comer, pensar. fiz duas cadeiras de filosofia, que adorei, mas na altura não aguentei (trabalho, letras à noite, outros cursos). além disso estava na católica, rodeada de seminaristas novíssimos e cheios de uma energia em bruto às oito da manhã. tanto temos falado de filosofia, a matemática das ideias em língua.

"There is no such thing as free will. There is a fundamental sense of the word 'free' in which this is incontrovertibly true; and this has been known for a long time. There are plenty of senses of the word 'free' in which it is false. But the sense in which it is true seems to be the one that matters most to most people. Or rather, it seems to be the one that most people think matters most to them — rightly or wrongly.
Why is this sense of 'free' so important? (Why is it thought to be so important?) Because it is, among other things, the sense of 'free' that is in question when it is said that because people are free agents, they can properly be held to be truly responsible for their actions in such a way as to be truly deserving of praise and blame for them. It is the ordinary, strong sense of the word 'free'. Chapter 2 presents one version of the argument that such freedom is impossible.

If Chapter 2 is supposed to prove that there is no such thing as free will, what is the rest of the book about? It is partly about some of those senses of the word 'free' given which free will can be said to exist. But it is principally concerned with what one might call the 'general cognitive phenomenology' of freedom: it is concerned with our beliefs, feelings, attitudes, practices, and ways of conceiving or thinking about the world, in so far as these involve the notion of freedom. It is concerned with the experience we have of being free agents, and of being truly responsible for what we do in such a way that we can be truly deserving of praise and blame. It considers the causes, the character, and the consequences of this experience.

Why concentrate in this way on the experience of being free, rather than the thing itself? Because the best way to try to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the free will debate, and of the reason why it is interminable, is to study the thing that keeps it going — our experience of freedom. Because this experience is something real, complex, and important, even if free will itself is not real. Because it may be that the experience of freedom is really all there is, so far as free will is concerned."

G. Strawson em Freedom and Belief.
from here.

and more:

A more cumbersome statement of the Basic Argument goes as follows.

(1) Interested in free action, we are particularly interested in actions that are performed for a reason (as opposed to 'reflex' actions or mindlessly habitual actions).

(2) When one acts for a reason, what one does is a function of how one is, mentally speaking. (It is also a function of one's height, one's strength, one's place and time, and so on. But the mental factors are crucial when moral responsibility is in question.)

(3) So if one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, one must be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking—at least in certain respects.

(4) But to be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must have brought it about that one is the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects. And it is not merely that one must have caused oneself to be the way one is, mentally speaking. One must have consciously and explicitly chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, and one must have succeeded in bringing it about that one is that way.

(5) But one cannot really be said to choose, in a conscious, reasoned, fashion, to be the way one is mentally speaking, in any respect at all, unless one already exists, mentally speaking, already equipped with some principles of choice, 'P1'—preferences, values, pro-attitudes, ideals—in the light of which one chooses how to be.

(6) But then to be truly responsible, on account of having chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must be truly responsible for one's having the principles of choice P1 in the light of which one chose how to be.

(7) But for this to be so one must have chosen P1, in a reasoned, conscious, intentional fashion.

(8) But for this, i.e. (7), to be so one must already have had some principles of choice P2, in the light of which one chose Pl.

(9) And so on. Here we are setting out on a regress that we cannot stop. True self-determination is impossible because it requires the actual completion of an infinite series of choices of principles of choice.'

(10) So true moral responsibility is impossible, because it requires true self-determination, as noted in (3).

This may seem contrived, but essentially the same argument can be given in a more natural form. (1) It is undeniable that one is the way one is, initially, as a result of heredity and early experience, and it is undeniable that these are things for which one cannot be held to be in any way responsible (morally or otherwise). (2) One cannot at any later stage of life hope to accede to true moral responsibility for the way one is by trying to change the way one already is as a result of heredity and previous experience. For (3) both the particular way in which one is moved to try to change oneself, and the degree of one's success in one's attempt at change, will be determined by how one already is as a result of heredity and previous experience. And (4) any further changes that one can bring about only after one has brought about certain initial changes will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by heredity and previous experience. (5) This may not be the whole story, for it may be that some changes in the way one is are traceable not to heredity and experience but to the influence of indeterministic or random factors. But it is absurd to suppose that indeterministic or random factors, for which one is ex hypothesi in no way responsible, can in themselves contribute in any way to one's being truly morally responsible for how one is.

The claim, then, is not that people cannot change the way they are. They can, in certain respects (which tend to be exaggerated by North Americans and underestimated, perhaps, by Europeans). The claim is only that people cannot be supposed to change themselves in such a way as to be or become truly or ultimately morally responsible for the way they are, and hence for their actions.

(Adapted from Freedom and Belief, 1986, published in Philosophical Studies, 75/1-2 (Kluwer 1994), 5-24, and reprinted in Free Will, ed. Watson, 2003, p.212.)

Saturday, December 10, 2016

sweetsker

Monday, November 28, 2016

on 'Captain Courageous'

"Now our Dr. [James] Conland had served in [the Gloucester] fleet when he was young. One thing leading to another, as happens in this world, I embarked on a little book which was called Captains Courageous. My part was the writing; his the details. This book took us (he rejoicing to escape from the dread respectability of our little town) to the shore-front, and the old T-wharf of Boston Harbour, and to queer meals in sailors’ eating-houses, where he renewed his youth among ex-shipmates or their kin. We assisted hospitable tug-masters to help haul three- and four-stick schooners of Pocahontas coal all round the harbour; we boarded every craft that looked as if she might be useful, and we delighted ourselves to the limit of delight. ... Old tales, too, he dug up, and the lists of dead and gone schooners whom he had loved, and I revelled in profligate abundance of detail—not necessarily for publication but for the joy of it. ...I wanted to see if I could catch and hold something of a rather beautiful localised American atmosphere that was already beginning to fade. Thanks to Conland I came near this."
da wiki.

Wednesday, November 23, 2016

#featherwithwords

starting my own tag, yay. sweet dreams are made of this.

Saturday, November 12, 2016

shopping mall


 ice rink getting ready
 sweeping with dinosaurs

 
Share